Is the specter of the Arab Spring haunting Ethiopia?

Alemayehu Fentaw, 4 June 2012

Although Ethiopia has never been a breeding ground for Islamism, the government has started to interfere in religious affairs in order to preempt radicalization. This strategy will most likely backfire, sowing the very seeds of political Islam that it seeks to keep at bay.

Ethiopia has been swept by Islamic protests ^↑ in opposition to what the Muslim community calls the 'government-sponsored propaganda activities' of the little-known Islamic sect, Al-Ahbash, throughout the country, and the suspension of the Addis Ababa-based Awolya Institute on the alleged grounds of promoting Wahhabism. The security forces reportedly killed four and injured ten Muslims during a confrontation after Friday prayers in Assassa in April and detained a large number of protesters in Addis Ababa in May. Eleven are being tried over charges concerning a terrorist bomb-plot ^↑ . According to Shimeles Kemal, the government spokesman, “The aim of the terror network was to establish an Islamic state by toppling the government.” 

The protesters ^↑ also accuse the Government of Ethiopia of hijacking the Islamic Affairs Supreme Council, or the Majlis. They demand that the current members of the Majlis are replaced by elected representatives. They also call for elections to be held in the city's mosques rather than in the Kebeles, local government institutions.

What are the roots of the current Islamic protests in Ethiopia? Without claiming to offer a complete account of the reasons and motivations behind these developments, this article outlines some possible explanations and important aspects.

In domestic politics, the introduction of ethnic federalism has resulted in, to borrow Milan Kundera’s expression, 'the unbearable lightness of being' Ethiopian. One undesired consequence of the constitutional enshrinement of identity politics, which extended recognition to ethnic and religious groups, rooted in historical interpretations of the marginalisation of non-Amharas and non-Christians, is the empowerment of particular religious identities such as Oromo or Muslim over a universalist national identity, that of 'being Ethiopian'. If the Islamic revival of the past two decades is the logical outcome of the rise of identity politics, radicalization is an unwanted side effect.

In international affairs, the US war on terror and Ethiopia's position as a key partner, coupled with its legitimate regional security concerns, have placed Ethiopia not only in the unenviable position of having to keep extremist elements such as Al-Shabab at bay, but also of countering the growing influence of Wahhabism at home. Most recently, fears over rising Islamism have spread widely in the wake of the Arab Spring. The problem with this is that tyrants such as Meles Zenawi won’t hesitate to use the pretext provided by national security to capitalize on his regional role in fighting terrorism, with the aim of garnering American support that he does not deserve, given his regime's disregard of human rights and free and fair elections as documented meticulously by the US Department of State Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, year after year. In the same way as Ethiopia’s military intervention in Somalia was used to annihilate regional rebels such as the ONLF and OLF, it is hard to rule out the possibility that this will also be used as another opportunity to clamp down on political dissidents.

Having said that, it has to be noted that different governmental actors have been engaged in misguided efforts to counter the growing Wahhabi influence in Ethiopia. The first actor is the Government of Ethiopia (GoE). The GoE through its Ministry of Federal Affairs, in joint cooperation with the Islamic Affairs Supreme Council (Majlis), has launched, since July 2011, nation-wide workshops on religious tolerance targeting the Muslim community. The Ministry of Federal Affairs is said to have allocated more than 11,000,000 Ethiopian Birr, or 800,000 USD, to the programme, bringing in trainers from the Al-Ahbash headquarters in Beirut. The continued public engagement of the Ministry of Federal Affairs in promoting Al-Ahbash, at the expense of the prevailing schools of jurisprudence of Sunni Islam such as Hannafi and Maliki is not only a clear contravention of the constitutional principle of secularism, but has also turned out to be unacceptable to the Muslim community.

It seem that the other source of interference is the United States. Recent wikileaked cables of the US embassy in Addis Ababa discuss the Wahhabist threat there at great length.

According to the first cable ^↑ , “The newly appointed Council [Majlis] is decidedly anti-Wahhabi and speaks openly of their concern about Wahhabi missionaries and their destabilizing influence in Ethiopia.” The same cable also elucidates the causes of intra-Muslim conflicts in the following terms, “Conflicts within the Muslim community have also arisen over control of mosques, which imams should be allowed to preach, and over control of Islamic education. The IASC [Majlis] wants to build an Ethiopian Muslim theological school so that young Ethiopian men will not have to go to the Middle East to study in preparation for becoming Imams, as they must now. These young men are increasingly studying in Saudi Arabia due to the generous scholarships and subsidies available there, and when they return to Ethiopia to take up their posts in new Saudi-funded mosques, they continue to receive subsidies from Saudi Arabia or Islamic NGOs. Unfortunately, the Sufi-dominated Muslim community in Ethiopia does not have sufficient funds to start their own theological school, nor can they counter the financial advantage Wahhabis have in Ethiopia.”

The same cable also addresses the question of why the US should care about Wahhabism in Ethiopia. It takes note of the prevalence of a culture of inter-faith tolerance among the three Abrahamic religions of the country as a result of mutual co-existence and the tradition of tolerance in Sufism. The cable claims, however, that “With the advent of Wahhabism in Ethiopia, … this delicate balance is in danger of being upset.” It goes on to assert that “Conflicts have begun first within the Muslim community, but have also begun to spread out to include Christian groups as Wahhabis seek to assert themselves on college campuses and in smaller towns outside the capital. The threat of inter-communal conflict in Ethiopia between Muslims and Christians, as well as between Muslims themselves, can only give a foothold and operating space to Salafist and extremist groups that might seek to exploit the situation.” The cable adds that “In a shift from past practice, the IASC is now completely purged of Wahhabi members. …the Council members acknowledged that the Council is now all Sufi and in their public statements they repeatedly make reference to Ethiopia’s tradition of religious tolerance and co-existence with the Christian communities. As the Ethiopian government appoints the members of the Islamic Council, it is clear that the GoE shares this concern about growing Wahhabi influence and is supporting moderate Muslim leaders in trying to counter that influence.”

US security interests in the Horn of Africa region are detailed in the second cable ^↑ , in which the Addis Ababa Embassy alleges that “Ethiopia’s delicate Muslim/Christian balance and historic attitudes between the faith communities regarding tolerance and mutual respect are being challenged, thereby undermining US interests in the region.”
The first cable concludes that “there are ways to counter this growing influence through aggressive cultural programming”, which the third cable ^↑ describes in more detail. The strategy centres on conserving Islamic places and objects, and restoring Ethiopia’s unique Islamic traditions by preserving its shrines, literature, and rituals as well as making moderate Islamic literature available in local languages. This strategy has for example been supported by grants and programmes such as the Ambassador’s Fund for Cultural Preservation grant to restore the Sheikh Hussein Shrine in Bale, the Jama Negus Mosque in Wello, the Teferi Mekonnen Palace in Harar, and the Muhammad Ali House in Addis Ababa; and also by translating Khaled Abou el-Fadl’s books, The Place of Tolerance in Islam and The Great Theft, into Amharic, Oromifa, and Somali.


With respect to the translation of Khalid Abou el-Fadl’s books, two earlier wikileaked cables ^↑ confirm ^↑ that the Embassy’s efforts at having them translated into Amharic and Oromiffa by Ethiopian Islamic scholars initially fell through, “because no Muslim translator in Ethiopia is willing to do it, fearing Wahhabi pressure.”

Even if conflicts have arisen between Wahhabis and Sufis, these have been very much localized hitherto. What is worrying is the government’s tendency to blow the threat out of proportions. Just a few years back, the ‘T’ word was ‘Khawarij’, now it is replaced by ‘Wahhabi’ and ‘Salafi’. It seems all the more perplexing that in a country such as Ethiopia where the Muslim population is roughly equal to the Christian and there isn’t any advocacy for forming an Islamic political party, let alone an existing organized Islamic party vying for public office, how demands for autonomy in religious affairs and governmental non-interference can be construed as a political movement. The declared disavowal of violence on the part of the Muslim community, and positive adherence to non-violent means in its protests so far demonstrate that the threat of Islamic militancy in Ethiopia is only a figment of Meles Zenawi’s imagination.

This is not to deny the legitimacy of the international and domestic security concerns of the US and Ethiopia, but to question the legitimacy and efficacy of the means used to achieve a legitimate end.

Washington should view Addis Ababa’s problems in the proper context of the wider issue of the rise of authoritarianism in domestic politics. The Arab Spring has already produced an Ethiopian winter as in many other sub-Sahara countries, for fear that comparable uprisings may emerge. Controls have been tightened. It has already become clear from the continued mounting crackdown on political dissidents and journalists following the Arab Street protests that the specter of the Arab Spring is haunting Meles Zenawi. Despite this, we should not lose sight of the fact that Ethiopian Muslims have, for much of their country’s history, been peaceful. Needless engagement could disturb the equilibrium of co-existence and tolerance maintained among the various Islamic sects as well as between Muslims and Christians in the country.

The right strategy would be to leave Islamic affairs to the Muslim community and faith-based non-governmental organizations. This again is not to gainsay the right of Al Ahbash or any other Islamic sect to operate in Ethiopia provided that it respects the laws of the land. The solution to the problem created by the securitization of Islam and intra-Islamic relations should be nothing but its de-securitization, not the privileging of one Islamic sect over another. Except for a few historical instances from the country’s remote past, Ethiopia has never been a breeding-ground for Sayyed Qutb- or Al Zawahiri-styled Islamism and there is little indication that it ever will be given that the Muslim community continues to enjoy and exercise its freedom of worship without interference.

Whatever else has been done by Addis Ababa will prove nothing but a recipe for future conflicts. The strategy deployed could easily backfire, thereby sowing the seeds of political Islam that it seeks to keep at bay. It is imperative to bear in mind that it is the marginalization and suppression of Muslims by the Ethiopian Christian State in the past that bred extremism. Current interference by the secular tyrant in the internal affairs of the Muslim community will do nothing but exacerbate the situation.

http://www.opendemocracy.net/alemayehu-fentaw/is-specter-of-arab-spring-haunting-ethiopia

“Ginbot 20″ which marks the TPLF dictatorship in Ethiopia was greeted by renewed resistance and attack on its economic interest.

June 01, 2012 By Qeerroo

Ginbot 20, 1983 E.C; which officially marked the TPLF control of power in Ethiopia was a day of celebration for the very few from Adwa political elites and party cadres members who enjoys the leftover of the big fishes. This year it is 21^thanniversary. For the majority of Ethiopians, specially the Oromo’s it is the day of humiliation, renewed looting, different and intensified form of dictatorship. Under the current government of Meles zenawi, who ruled Ethiopia for the last 21 years, the Oromo’s have suffered the most and more than 35,000 remained political prisoners. These include Lelisa Olbana and Beqele Garba, Leaders of the officially registered OFDM and OPC parties.

In a way that looks pretty well organized, the people from the central, western and southern Oromiya has flashed their rejection of the day and the authorities on power by an act of arson on selected party economic interest, attack on the cadres and disruption of events. In central Oromiya, a warehouse of a known TPLF agent and land grabber at Gooroo area was attacked and a property estimated at more than 10 million Eth birr was damaged. Shocked by the incident right around the capital city the authorities have responded by heavy presence of the army, which includes mistreatment of innocent individuals.

In Hawasa University, the huge music concert was disrupted by committed students, which resulted in the huge mess and the burning of cars belonging to the party cadres. Despite the change of venue, the authorities failed to secure their event and the students were able to clearly speak out unequivocally that the day does not concern them except for its curse of invisible apartheid, looting and dictatorship.

In Western Shoa zone of Gindeberet and Midekengi, organized members of the community have attacked the power transformer in the neighborhood and the celebration meant was turned in to complete darkness. In Qellem Wollega too, the residents of Ashi and Garjeda villages showed their resistance by abstaining to appear on the events. However, when the government militias were trying to force residents to the event, the people responded by pulling its available weapon to chase them away. In Dambi Dollo town, several messages of resistance were posted in protest to the day and Meles led government of Ethiopia.

In Western Wollega zone of Haroo Limmu district, where several clashes has been reported in 2012; the organized resistance of the people have killed the special agent of the government Mr. Sibhat Araya, who was notorious for his anti-Oromo stance and assigned to the areas to hunt down “supporters of the Oromo Liberation Front”. After the attack, his handgun was handed over to the leaders of the resistance group.

http://qeerroo.net/2012/06/01/ginbot-20-which-marks-the-tplf-dictatorship-in-ethiopia-was-greeted-by-renewed-resistance-and-attack-on-its-economic-interest/

EPRDF’s Dominance in Ethiopian Politics

By Seble Teweldebirhan

Addis Ababa, June 4, 2012 (Ezega.com) - The Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) celebrated the 21st anniversary of the party’s successful conquest of political power last week. As usual Ginbot 20 (May 28) was remembered for the seventeen years of difficult armed struggle to defeat the Derg regime and the endurance and bravery of it’s fighters. In addition, the ‘constitutional rights’ guaranteed as a result of Ginbot 20 victory was over-emphasized as part of the celebration.  

One of the fundamental human rights Ginbot 20 credited for is civil and political rights ensured under the FDRE constitution. The constitution guaranteed the Ethiopian people freedom of association for any cause or purpose. It ensured the rights of every one to vote, to be elected, and to participate in public affairs directly or through representatives. In addition, every citizen has a right to be a member in any political organization by his/her own will. In other words, the constitution creates a suitable environment for a multi-party system in Ethiopia.

However, it is clear that, for the last two decades the nation has been ‘unsuccessful’ in forming a strong and trustworthy political party or individual politicians other than the ones already in power. At this point many are starting to wonder if Ethiopia, regardless of constitutional promise for multi-party system, is slowly moving back to where it all started. To many, the outlook appears to be that the nation is once again on a path to one-party system and, at its worst, a one-man rule. Indeed, just as Haile Selassie and his imperial rule dominated the country or Mengistu Hailemariam and his Ethiopian People Workers Party had absolute authority over the country, today PM Meles Zenawi and his party, the EPRDF, are the dominant political figures.

However, some disagree and suggest that the present-day Ethiopia by any standard cannot be seen as a one-party state. Rather, the country has formed a dominant single party system, which is common in some nations with respectable democracy. The difference between a one-party and dominant single party system has a demarcation blurred in certain situations. However, it is possible to come up with some clear differences.

A dominant single party system may be defined as that despite the multi-party situation in the country, only one party is dominant and directs the political system by default. That party is firmly in control of state power over a long period of time. In this system periodic elections and other democratic gestures exist. In fact, multi-party activity is always behind the scenes. However, one particular party wins elections every time, and it might be difficult to forecast when that party will fall and lose elections. The reason why a single party dominates politics power differs depending on the history of each nation. Singapore, Russia, and most African nations, including South Africa and Tanzania, are examples of dominant single party system created through multi-party elections.

On the other hand, a one-party system is a system where there is only one political party in the country, and formation of any other opposition party is prohibited. For that matter, in most one-party system countries, there are no periodic elections. Eritrea, Cuba and China are some of the examples for a one-party state.

From the above brief description, it is possible to see, theoretically, where Ethiopia stands. Unlike the suggestion by many, the country actually formed dominant single party system, with a number of existing opposition parties unable to break into power.

The main question is how that is better than a one-party system. Dominant single party system is mostly criticized for anti-democratic features. This is because of the popular belief that alternation of power is a very crucial element for democracy – and for long-term development, for that matter. The main concern on dominant party system is the governing party sees less and less need to respond to public opinion because it is always assured of re-election all the time. It is therefore reasonable to argue that this in most cases leads to autocratic rule and abuse of power. It also weakens the separation of power and puts the integrity of the legislature in question.  In addition, the vital elements of democracy, which is genuine competition and uncertainty in the outcome of elections are absent in a dominant single party system. There is also concern that a dominant single party system will likely lead to a one-party system.

Dominant single party system, however, for some is not all that bad. Scholars suggest that its advantages are worthy of consideration. This is because a political party can be dominant with democratic means. If it manages to win the hearts of its citizen repeatedly, regardless of existence of strong opposition, then it could be a sign of political stability especially in fragmented political environment.

EPRDF won the last election with more than 99% of the vote. So far, the society as well as the party expects similar results in the next election.  For two decades, the only significant challenge to the ruling party was the 2005 election. Even that, one way or another ended with great political victory for EPRDF. The party that lost considerable votes gained a lot of acceptance after oppositions failed to meet any of the expectations of the electorate. The fact that they ended up refusing to join parliament, and embarrassingly fought between one another and kept blaming each other, formed breakaway mini-parties, some fled the country, and others failed to show any integrity and sound strategy to confront the ruling party was a huge political victory for EPRDF, even better than election win, some argue. (It must also be mentioned here that many also argue with reason that, whether the opposition had joined the government or not, the path to genuine multi-party system was doomed from the start – for lack of independent judiciary and military, they say. But this is a topic for another discussion some day.)

All of this created an environment for the ruling party to be dominant. However, one might question if the EPRDF played a role in this drama of the opposition and gained its dominance in an undemocratic manner. In other words, does all of this come, as the officials claim, with no intention of their own, but just because the opposition couldn’t manage to build the capacity to become a strong challenger?

Now the most important question is, is the country heading eventually to a single party system because we could not and do not have strong opposition parties?

The failure of the opposition parties in Ethiopian helped create an attitude among the public that says ‘Ethiopia is better off with the EPRDF’. During the 2010 election, many people voted for the ruling party, and their reason was that there was no better alternative. The oppositions in their own time seem to have lost the trust and acceptance of the public. Highly fragmented, weakened and confused, they seem to lack the reliability and endurance to flight and mount any significant challenge to the ruling party.

In addition, today, those who lead opposition parties happen to be individuals who have already disappointed the public politically in the past. The existing parties, even the main ones, have failed to show a clear vision for the country and present a compelling political agenda, or could not reach the public even if they have the strategy. Their voice is unheard on many of the critical problems of the society, unless when they blame or insult one another. At times, their comments and actions are hypocritical. For example they accuse the ruling party for worshipping individuals, creating a one-man rule and dominating the politics while their entire existence solely depended on individuals and never show any spirit of democracy or power sharing in their inside party politics.

For the ruling party, their every move seems a boost in its run to dominate the country politics. This is used to disgrace them in the eyes of the public and present them as a joke rather than an alternative. 

However, the argument mostly is that the EPRDF intentionally played opposition parties in their eventual doom. Many cite the tough and challenging legal environment that followed as a reason. Especially after the 2005 election, several legislations that targeted and weakened the opposition one way or another were written into law. In addition, the public media is used almost entirely for ruling party programs and the miniature private media in Ethiopia never grew. Therefore, most opposition parties in Ethiopia are unknown even at name level. Some opposition leaders may have also been victimized for their political run, including economically ruined as they claim.

Regardless, it is proper to suggest opposition parties share a significant role for EPRDF’s political dominance in the country today. Indeed they have shown already in 2005 that there is a chance to influence power however small that may be. They won 100 seats in the House of Representatives, which has the highest political power in the country. The ruling party admitted this win at the time and was ready to give them (at least in theory) their share of power. This may have been the beginning of the moderating process in an otherwise the dominance of EPRDF.

The path they chose is well-known. Presently, they keep embarrassing the politics by sometimes acting in an irresponsible and self-centered manner, as if committed to popularize the ruling party.

A tough political environment is to be expected in a country like Ethiopia. The fact that the EPDRF itself came to power through armed struggle means sharing or giving-up power through elections is not conventional. In general, such parties have the history of resistance for opposition of any kind. However, if opposition parties choose to challenge this, it is important to come up with practical and clear vision and long-term strategy, and one that is not dependent on individuals, but rather on a party system. If not, they will always be doomed. After all, political game in countries like Ethiopia is not all about the best interests of the people, but rather a constant struggle to be relevant and/or stay in power. http://www.ezega.com/News/NewsDetails.aspx?Page=heads&NewsID=3303