East Africa: The Bad News Over Badme - Why Ethiopia Won't Back Down On Eritrean Border

ANALYSIS

For several years, combat along the tense Eritrean-Ethiopian frontier has been entirely rhetorical. This changed on March 16th, 2012 when the Ethiopian government boldly announced that it had crossed into Eritrean territory in an attack on three military installations.

Citing Asmara's role in the January death and abduction of European tourists in Ethiopia's Afar region, Ethiopia's retaliation represented the first direct military confrontation between Eritrea and Ethiopia since the 1998-2000 border war.

Coincidentally, these events came one month before the 10th anniversary of the delimitation decision of the Eritrean Ethiopian Boundary Commission. The EEBC was the product of the Algiers Accord, which formally ended the Eritrean-Ethiopian war by referring the border dispute to arbitration. The EEBC's findings should have been the final chapter in the bloody border row between the two countries, but instead, gave the dispute new momentum. The crux of the problem was that Ethiopia rejected the EEBC's decision when it realized that Badme, the small piece of disputed territory that triggered the border war, and which it had acquired at a high human cost, had been awarded to Eritrea. Addis later accepted the decision "in principle," but demanded negotiations on the normalization of relations before it would permit the disputed border to be demarcated (and return Badme to Eritrea).

Eritrea responded by invoking the language of the Algiers accord, asserting that the because EEBC decision was designed to be "final and binding," attempts to link its implementation to the normalization of relations were, ipso facto, a violation of existing agreements between the two parties. Only after the border was demarcated and Badme returned, could dialogue on normalization be held.

While the Eritrean position should not be viewed uncritically, from an international legal perspective, the Red Sea state had the facts on its side. After all, both Eritrea and Ethiopia signed on the dotted line.

Over the course of the next decade, this stalemate engendered openly hostile security competition between Asmara and Addis, which often played out in venues far from the Eritrean-Ethiopian frontier-- Sudan, Somalia, and the UN Security Council. The domestic effects of the dispute have not been minor either, as Eritrea's youth remains indefinitely mobilized for war, at a huge cost to their individual liberty and the country's overall economy.

So what explains Ethiopia's refusal to implement the EEBC decision? The oft cited personal enmity between the conflict's two primary protagonists, Ethiopian Prime Minister Meles Zenawi and Eritrean President Issias Afeworki, is only part of the story. As is the reality that Ethiopia incurs few costs for its recalcitrance, since it retains significant military and diplomatic advantages over Eritrea.

Instead, a more complete portrait of Addis Ababa's calculations would acknowledge three basic points. First, the government of Meles Zenawi refuses to implement the EEBC decision because it has no reasonable guarantee that such action will alter the aggressive, adversarial strategic posture of Eritrea. Second, the Meles regime believes that if it permitted border demarcation and the return of Badme, only to face the continuation of the onerous security rivalry with Asmara, it would pay high domestic costs. Third, the genesis of these two beliefs can only be understood through a careful consideration of the origins of the Eritrean-Ethiopian border war.

The Costs of Partition

Although Prime Minister Meles Zenawi warmly embraced Eritrean independence in 1993, this position was not cheap. Never a dominant force within TPLF party structures, Meles faced substantial criticism from internal party rivals, in addition to a large segment of Ethiopia's non-TPLF political class, for the manner in which his government partitioned the country.

There were several objections, and the list seemed to grow longer as time wore on. The decision to formally grant Eritrean independence involved little public consultation (at least on the Ethiopian side), and the Eritrean referendum on independence was widely panned as biased in favor secession. Nor was Ethiopia's access to the sea the guaranteed, an issue that many believed imperiled the nation's economic security, and was of major emotional and symbolic significance to the Ethiopian public. Adding fuel to the fire was the reality that Eritreans continued to occupy a visible role in Ethiopia's economy, creating the impression that the Eritreans had acquired the benefits of secession, but paid none of the costs.

Whatever the merits of these criticisms, Meles was not in a good position to refute them. Having cultivated close personal relations with the leadership of Eritrea's rebel group turned ruling party, the EPLF, and having relied on their support in winning political power, Meles found it hard to dispel the impression that he was an Eritrean lackey. Reinforcing these perceptions was the uncomfortable fact that Meles is himself half-Eritrean.

So what did this all mean? The bottom line is that by the mid -1990's, the political career of PM Meles, and those affiliated with his faction within the TPLF, hinged on making the relationship with Eritrea "work." The Meles faction expended large amounts of political capital in accepting Eritrean independence on unfavorable terms, and if the relationship went sour, they would be left holding the bag.

Events leading up to the surprise outbreak of war in May 1998 should be understood in this context.[1] When difficult partition related issues began to surface between Asmara and Addis, the most important of which were related to trade and borders, Meles faced a difficult task: he had to placate the critics in his own party, who demanded a harder line on Eritrea, while preserving the amicable bi-lateral relationship on which his political reputation depended.

The Badme "Betrayal"

As events would soon demonstrate, this was a tension that the Meles faction could not resolve. Throughout 1997 and early 1998, the Prime Minister's rivals stoked tensions along the Eritrean-Ethiopian border. Gebru Asrat, who would later lead the charge against Meles within the TPLF, served as Governor of the Ethiopian border province of Tigray, the ideal perch from which to gin up war. It was here that things took a turn for the worse.

While Asmara was no doubt aware of the pressure Meles faced, this recognition did not appear to inform their strategy. Instead of demonstrating restraint, and working with the Prime Minister to marginalize hardliners within his party, it did just the opposite. The killing of several Eritrean officers in the vicinity of Badme served as the final provocation, as Asmara responded with overwhelming force, seizing all of the disputed territories and dismantling their local Ethiopian administrations.

The Eritrean gambit was nothing new. In 1995, Asmara pursued a similarly muscular strategy in its dispute with Yemen over the Hanish Islands: deploy overwhelming force to assert control over contested land, and enter into negotiations from a position of strength. Yet to Meles and his allies, this was a critical betrayal by a neighboring government for whom they had sacrificed so much.

In Addis, the Eritrean maneuver incited a power struggle within the TPLF that would place Meles' political career on life support. The Prime Minister was excoriated for having coddled the Eritreans, and for failing to make proper military preparations for the defense of Ethiopia's territorial integrity. As his rivals within the ruling party publicly sounded the alarm for war, Meles privately attempted to put the brake on their efforts, in the hope that peace with Eritrea could be salvaged, and his pro-Eritrea foreign policy validated.

Yet again, Asmara did Meles no favors. Initially surprised by the shrill rhetoric emanating from the Ethiopian capital, President Isaias stood fast, refusing to relinquish control over territories he believed to be both Eritrean, and militarily defensible. Now sitting between a rock and a hard place, Meles grudgingly accepted the demand for war. Still, the PM's rivals remained unappeased, labeling him "a reluctant warrior."[2] The Eritrea issue now became a virtual albatross around the neck of the Meles faction.

Never Make the Same Mistake Twice

The split within the TPLF produced by events at Badme would play out over the next few years, and become more acute as events on the battlefield began to shift in Ethiopia's favor. In March 2001, the internal struggle would end decisively in victory for the Meles Zenawi faction. Yet the Prime Minister came perilously close to losing power, and it was easy to understand why he would hold Asmara responsible. Having supported Eritrea in the partition process, and paid dearly for it, the Meles faction expected Asmara to return the favor by demonstrating to their internal opponents that the relationship between the two countries could be amicable and mutually beneficial. Instead, Asmara's aggressive behavior at Badme betrayed the Meles faction's trust, and rendered them vulnerable within their own party.

The current impasse over the EEBC decision is informed by this history. While Meles is not as vulnerable to internal challenge as he once was, he faces an eerily familiar situation. Without a quid pro quo, demarcating the border is analogous to the no-strings-attached independence of Eritrea. Like the highly unfavorable terms of Eritrean independence, returning Badme to Eritrea will be domestically unpopular, and evoke similar claims about Meles' pro-Eritrean disposition. And like the fiasco at Badme, a flare-up between Asmara and Addis subsequent to the implementation of the EEBC decision would leave Meles facing a profound domestic crisis of confidence.

What this all means for the international community's approach to the Eritrean-Ethiopian border dispute is uncertain. Yet concerned parties would do well to understand what makes the conflict's protagonists tick. Ethiopian equivocation over a "final and binding" delimitation decision - a key hurdle in the resolution of the Eritrean-Ethiopian border dispute - is dictated by perceptions of risk firmly rooted in the complex origins of the Eritrean-Ethiopian war. This doesn't exonerate the Meles government, but it does place its behavior in more intelligible terms.

Mike Woldemariam is assistant professor at Boston University's department of international relations.

http://allafrica.com/stories/201205230666.html

Amnesty Warns Ethiopia, Rwanda Not to Trade Rights for Growth

Gabe Joselow VOA

May 23, 2012

NAIROBI - Amnesty International is concerned that Rwanda and Ethiopia are overlooking their commitments to human rights for the sake of economic growth. A new report from the human rights group says the authoritarian governments of both countries have stifled the opposition and persecuted journalists. 

In the past seven years, Ethiopia has sustained an 11 percent economic growth rate and substantially reduced poverty among its 83 million citizens.

The country has gone to great lengths to incorporate the United Nations Millennium Development Goals into its national policy, enforced by an authoritarian ruling party that has been in power for the last 20 years.

Amnesty Africa Program Director Erwin van der Borght says these improvements have come at a cost.

“Certainly Ethiopia has made progress in terms of its economic development, but in a way it has neglected to respect and protect civil and political rights such as the right to freedom of expression, association and peaceful assembly," said van der Borght.

The Ethiopia chapter of Amnesty's 2012 human rights report highlights key rights concerns in the country, including legislation restricting rights organizations, and the arrests of hundreds of opposition members and journalists.

Van der Borght says it is in Ethiopia's own economic interest to loosen political restrictions.

“It's a given that a strong opposition makes often a better government," he said. "And if you don't allow that space for civil society or political opposition, then in the longer term you may put at risk the progress you've made in terms of development and economic growth.”

Van der Borght notes that Tunisia and other North African countries rocked by the Arab Spring also had fast-growing economies before the uprisings.

Amnesty International has similar concerns for Rwanda.

The country has also experienced rapid growth in the past few years, under the firm guidance of President Paul Kagame and his party, the Rwandan Patriotic Front.

The World Bank named Rwanda among the 10 most improved economies in 2010.  This year, it was ranked the third easiest place to do business in Africa this year.

The Amnesty International report on Rwanda decries what he calls arbitrary arrests and unfair convictions of government critics and the unlawful detention of journalists.

But, van der Borght says the country could improve if it finally enacted proposed reforms to reduce state control of the media.|

“You could expect some positive change," said van der Borght. "However, if you look at the reality on the ground, we haven't seen any significant progress yet. Individuals are still prosecuted under the same legislation that the government wants to reform. So that's not a good sign.”

The media reform laws are making their way through the Rwandan parliament and are expected to be taken up by the senate soon. http://www.voanews.com/content/amnesty-warns-ethiopia-rwanda-not-to-trade-rights-for-growth/940236.html

World Bank to Fund Destructive Dam Through the Backdoor?

 By Peter Bosshard  Policy Director, International Rivers

05/23/2012 

Some projects are so destructive that no reputable actors want to get involved with them. Think of the oil wells in Sudan's conflict zones, China's Three Gorges Dam, and the gas pipelines in Burma. If the price is right, however, some will still be tempted to do business on such projects through the back door. The World Bank is currently taking such an approach with a big credit for Ethiopia's power sector.

The Gibe III Dam, now under construction in Southwest Ethiopia, will devastate ecosystems that support 500,000 indigenous people in the Lower Omo Valley and around Kenya's Lake Turkana. The U.N.'s World Heritage Committee called on the Ethiopian government to "immediately halt all construction" on the project, which will impact several sites of universal cultural and ecological value. In August 2011, the Kenyan parliament passed a resolution asking for the suspension of dam construction pending further studies.

Ethiopia is one of the world's highest recipients of foreign aid, and in spite of a poor record on human rights, Prime Minister Meles Zenawi is one of the darlings of the international community. The World Bank, the African Development Bank and the European Investment Bank all considered funding for the Gibe III Dam in 2009-10. In the end, none of them got involved in a project that caused an international outcry and clearly violated their social and environmental safeguard policies.

The World Bank would like to turn Ethiopia and the Democratic Republic of Congo into regional hydropower "batteries" that can electrify large parts of Africa. Doing so would require the construction of large dam cascades and extensive transmission networks in Eastern and Central Africa. The record of dam building in Ethiopia and the Congo is such that the World Bank is not keen to get involved with these messy projects directly. Instead it plans to pour large amounts of foreign aid into the transmission lines on which the power projects depend.

On June 21, the World Bank is expected to submit to its Board of Directors a credit of $684 millionfor a 1,000-kilometer-long transmission line from Ethiopia to Kenya. Strong evidence links this transmission line to the Gibe III Dam. The Resettlement Action Plan, an official project document, states that the line "is planned to provide reliable power supply to Kenya by taking it from Ethiopia's Gilgel Gibe hydropower scheme." In a letter to Friends of Lake Turkana, an environmental group, the Bank confirmed in March 2010 that the Ethiopian government had "asked the World Bank to consider providing funding support to the Gibe III hydropower project and the associated transmission lines."

Now that the impacts of the Gibe III Dam have become so publicly apparent, the Bank no longer wants to be associated with it. In a meeting last month with environmental organizations, Bank managers claimed that the transmission line would not be used to export electricity from the mega-dam on the Omo River. The Bank even edited the Resettlement Action Plan and replaced the reference to Gibe by "from Ethiopia's power grid" in its version of the document.

Transmission lines and power projects depend on each other. If transmission lines become a focus of the World Bank's development aid for Africa, the institution needs to clarify where the electricity for these projects will come from. It needs to prove that the power for these systems can be generated without destroying critical ecosystems and violating human rights, in compliance with the Bank's own standards. Organizations such as Christian Aid and International Rivers have documented that Africa's power needs can be addressed without building destructive dams in Ethiopia and the Congo.

On May 21, a coalition of environmental organizations from Kenya, the U.S. and Europe raised these concerns with the World Bank. In a letter to Bank President Robert Zoellick, they argued that "the Bank should not fund a transmission line that would source its power from the Gibe III Dam or from any other project that massively violates its safeguard policies." The World Bank is supposed to reduce poverty, not maximize profits. If a project is so destructive that it cannot be funded directly, the Bank should not support it through the back door of a transmission line. http://www.huffingtonpost.com/peter-bosshard/world-bank-ethiopia-kenya_b_1537932.html

Oromia-Ethiopia: The War of Meles Zenawi’s Regime on the Oromo Islamic Religious Faith

By Leenjiso Horo* | May 2012 Gadaa.com

The Tigrayan regime of Meles Zenawi has commissioned, planned, instigated, ordered, aided and abetted a criminal, political and military war on the Oromo people and their Islamic religious faith. And now, it has undertaken a violent and barbaric attack on the peaceful prayers at Mosque, in town of Asaasaa in Arsii, southeastern region of Oromia. In this fascistic, violent attack, the regime has massacred men, women and children. The land was covered with the blood of innocent victims of the residents of Asaasaa and its vicinities. This is a war on the Oromo people; a war regarding their religious beliefs. It is now time for the Oromo nationalists to open their eyes.

This is not a new war; this war of Meles Zenawi’s regime against the Oromo religious faith, particularly the Islamic faith, is something that had happened in the past. This old war began with Emperor Yohannis IV of Tigray against the Oromo of Wallo and their Islamic faith. This is the continuation of that same war. That old war is now renewed again at a larger scale, throughout Oromiyaa. So what was Yohannis’ old war on the Oromo people and their Islamic religion? It has now became the beginning of Meles Zenawi’s new war on the Oromo people, their political and social organizations as well as their religious faith. It is a war to fulfill the mission of Emperor Yohannes IV of Tigray, a mission that started a century ago. The mission was, always has been, and it still continues to be, to destroy the Oromo people, their religions, and their social and political institutions.

Emperor Yohannis IV of Tigray was a religiously zealot, fanatic Orthodox Christian, and a madman that ferociously fought against the Oromo of Wallo and their Islamic religious faith. He began by giving an ultimatum to the Oromo of Wallo to be converted to his version of Christianity; some were even forcefully converted while others refused. He declared war on those who refused to be converted to his faith. In that war, he slaughtered hundreds of thousands of Oromo. He mutilated the limbs of innocent victims and forced them out of the Wallo region – causing some to go into hiding. With this, he demolished mosques and built churches in their place. Consequently, his successor Emperor Menelik II of Abyssinia also wagged war against the Oromo and their Waqeffanna faith, the Oromiyaan indigenous religion. In that war, he almost obliterated the whole Oromo population. He destroyed all Galma, the Oromo religious shrines. On the sights of shrines, he erected the Abyssinian Orthodox churches.

Meles Zenawi came to Oromiyaa in 1991 with the aim and purpose of destroying the Oromo people. First, his attack began with Oromo political and humanitarian organizations, including the legal ones. Then, he dismantled all of them, including the Oromo Relief Association (ORA) and the Oromo Human Rights League. Having accomplished this, he built concentration camps all over Oromiyaa for the incarcerations of the Oromo nationals. Then, his regime declared the OLF a “terrorist” organization. With that, he categorized the Oromo people as the supporter of “terrorism.” With this false accusation, hundreds of thousands of were imprisoned, tortured, raped, maimed, and killed. Some imprisoned for life. Hundreds of thousands are forced into exile. Hundreds of thousands were put in the concentration camps. Hundreds of thousands were kidnapped and disappeared. The Oromo students have become a target for imprisonment, torture, and expelled from their schools. The regime burned down Oromiyaan forests; poisoned rivers and lakes; it has engaged in leasing and selling of Oromiyaa’s fertile farmlands to global multinational corporations in which the Tigrayans are the shareholders. It controlled the import and export, including the local businesses. It engaged in dividing Oromo nationals on regional basis to weaken the Oromo national struggle. It tried to create conflicts between Oromo religious faiths: between Christians and Muslims, though it was not successful. It is clear Wayyanee (TPLF), the Tigrayan regime, has gone through all phases and stages in its fight against the Oromo people.

Recently, his regime has declared the Oromiyaa’s southeastern regions of Arsii and Baalee as “terrorist” regions and the Oromo residents of these regions as “terrorist” people. The barbaric slaughter of innocent peaceful men, women and children at Mosque in Asaasaa town in Arsii region is a part of a long plan, drawn up and put into action by the Meles Zenawi’s colonial regime in its war against the Oromo people. This time it happens to be in the name of Islamic religion. Next time, the attack may take another form. It is not secret that every successive Abyssinian colonial ruler was hostile to the Oromo people, and their religions: Islam, Waqeeffanna, and Christianity versions of the Oromo people, and so are Meles Zenawi and his cohorts. This hostility is now directed against the Oromo Islamic religion. This clearly appears to be the beginning of a new attack by Meles Zenawi’s colonial regime in following his ancestor, Yohannes IV. Meles Zenawi’s government massacre of Oromo is not the end, but it is the begging of even more massacre yet to come. This is an extremely radical terrorist regime. In addition to using the power of the state to severely punish and silence political expression and religious freedom, this regime has also been training, arming, sponsoring and leading vigilantes, infiltrators and spies to create violence, to kidnap, and to kill Oromo nationals.

The regime’s attempt is to create a religious conflict within Oromiyaa proper in order to seek financial and military aid from foreign sources and sponsors in the name of fighting “terrorism.” Its purpose is to stay in power as long as it can by creating contradictions and violence within the Oromo people by pitting members of one religious faith against each other, and at the same time to create doubts between Muslim faith and other faiths in the empire. All nationals must understand this sinister scheme of Meles Zenawi’s regime and fight it.

It is important that our people stand together against this criminal war. The war is against Oromummaa (Oromoness). Any attack on any Oromo religion is an attack on Oromummaa. For this, the attack on Oromo Islamic religious faith is an attack on the Oromo. It is time to understand the purpose, the nature and the character of this brutal attack. The purpose of the attack on the Oromo is to destroy them as a people in the name of religion. Its nature is military and its character is domination, dehumanization and exploitation of the people. It must be understood that the regime is not against the two billion followers of Islamic religious faith in the world. On the contrary, the regime is against Oromo and their Islamic religious faith. In this case, the regime’s primary goal is either to split or to change the Oromo followers of Islamic religious faith in order to create an Abyssinianized version of Islamic religious faith within the Oromo followers of Islamic religious faith that supports and becomes loyal to the Abyssinian colonial empire state. Here, the regime’s attempt is to create a religious version of OPDO. Meles Zenawi is now using his regime’s political, military, and financial muscles in order to effectuate the creation of such a division in order to establish the Abyssinianization of the Oromo Islamic religious faith that supports the Abyssinian colonial empire state.

The regime has already falsely categorized as “extremists,” much like “al-Qaeda,” and as supporters of “terrorists” those Oromo Muslims who rejected such sinister scheme of Abyssinianizing their religious faith. The Oromo Muslims, Christians, Waqeffataas, and all Oromo of various faith and beliefs and the Oromo followers of no particular religious faith and beliefs must join hand-to-hand and stand shoulder-to-shoulder to unequivocally condemn, and fight against this insane Ethiopian regime’s act of political, religious, and physical violence that have been taking place against the Oromo of Islamic faith.

As all people, the Oromo people regard their religion as a relationship between themselves and their God, whom they consider as holy, sacred. Spiritual or divine. Religion is a personal belief. It is a personal issue. It is an institutionalized attitude, beliefs and practices of individuals or groups held with deep faith. It is not in the business of state either to create it or to change it, or to tell the people the way to worship it or how to worship it; or to tell the people how to pray or not or when to pray or not. It is only the business of the religion followers and their religious leadership. Tigrayan political elites and state interference in the internal affairs of Oromo Muslim faith is to curtail the freedom of Oromo individuals or groups from believing in, or from practicing, or from promoting their religion the way they see it fit their religion. In addition, Meles Zenawi’s primary purpose of interference in the internal affair of religious faith is to polarize the Oromo people along religious lines. He had already successfully done along regional lines. Now, he wants to repeat the same on the basis of religion. This is a radically extremist regime – a fascist regime. It must be opposed; it must be fought. It must be defeated. It is your patriotic duty as an Oromo to oppose, to fight and to defeat this enemy of your people.

Oromiyaa Shall be free!

* Leenjiso Horo can be reached at tguyyoo@yahoo.com

Ethiopians take a stand against leader

May 24 2012 at 11:00am 
By Yusuf Omar

About 300 Ethiopians descended on the streets of Sandton

on Wednesday, almost bringing business to a standstill.

They gathered at noon on the corner of Alice Lane and 5th Street, outside the Sandton Convention Centre, which is hosting this year’s Global African Diaspora Summit.

“Freedom!” they cried. “Allahu Akbar (Arabic for “Praise be to God”),” they yelled. “Viva South Africa, viva!” they cheered.

Most of the participants were political asylum-seekers from Ethiopia now living in Joburg. Their banners read “Meles Zenawi, most notorious, evil, brutal east African dictator Terrorist alive!”.

Zenawi, Ethiopian president for the past 21 years, arrived in Joburg on Wednesday to attend the three-day summit.

Mulugeta Felkea, chairman of the human rights organisation Better Ethiopian, left his home country seven years ago after family members were killed by the regime’s security forces.

“We can’t protest like this in Ethiopia. The soldiers would just shoot us,” he said.

“We want the South African government to influence the international community to take action against Zenawi. He must stop the harassment, release political prisoners and have real elections,” said Felkea.

He said there were officially more than 50 000 Ethiopians in SA, but reckoned there were many more under the radar.

Fana Dereje, general secretary of the Ethiopian Community Organisation, said: “We would return to Ethiopia tomorrow if peace was restored.”

“Right now we are second-class citizens in our own country. The people are hungry, but Zenawi gives us bullets.

The Ethiopian community thanks South Africa for hosting us during these hard times,” he said.

The strongest voice on the loudhailer, leading the men at the front of the march, was that of a woman – actress, journalist and activist Gelila Mekonnen.

She was due to leave on Thursday for Amsterdam, where she works at the Ethiopian Satellite Television headquarters.

“The Ethiopian government calls our independent television station a terrorist channel, but we are simply struggling for democracy,” said Mekonnen.

On Sunday night, more than 1 000 Ethiopian migrants met at the Standard Bank Arena in Joburg to raise funds for the tv station, which they hope to launch in SA this year.

yusuf.omar@inl.co.za http://www.iol.co.za/news/politics/ethiopians-take-a-stand-against-leader-1.1303851

Ethiopia: Bringing Africa Upfront - Who Is Responsible?

By allAfrica.com

Interview

Pascal Lamy is a European in a French way. His rich experience in politics and business has acquainted him with a rare capability to talk about global issues easily. As the director general of the World Trade Organisation (WTO), a 155-member global trade supervising body, he unrelentlessly works to create smooth global trade. With Ethiopia approaching the critical step of its accession to the WTO, disclosing its service sector offers, he claims that he sees progress, though not swift.
In this exclusive interview with Getachew T. Alemu, OP-ED EDITOR, at the World Economic Forum (WEF) on Africa, held in Addis Abeba, last week, he shared his views on issues ranging from market integration to his attitude towards the administration of Prime Minister Meles Zenawi. Excerpts:
Fortune: There was talk of market integration in most of the sessions of the World Economic Forum (WEF) on Africa. Ethiopia has actually been passive in pursuing the regional integration agenda. What do you think are the prominent challenges of market integration in Africa and, specifically, for Ethiopia?
Pascal Lamy: Ethiopia has, so far, chosen a model of development, which is growing domestically and exporting mostly outside Africa, to European, American, Indian, and Chinese markets, and, so far, it has worked. If you look at it analytically, partly, it emerges from the geographical location of Ethiopia, with limited access to the sea and neighbouring countries that are still politically extremely unstable.
I have no doubt that, in the medium or long term, Ethiopia will join this movement of African integration. This is what is happening within the East Africa community, which is a good example of a number of, so far, successful economic and trade integrations.
According to plans, which are both AU level and regional level, Africa has, as a project, to defragment and succeed in moving its trade pattern from a classical, colonial pattern, where 60pc of the exports of Africa are fuels and minerals, only 20pc manufactures, and 10pc to 15pc food, to something that is more diversified. But, the fact that Ethiopia is still, for instance, negotiating its accession to World Trade Organisation (WTO) is also a sign that, for the moment, the priority has been to grow domestically.
I think. It is understandable, given the size of the market. It is a big country by African standards. But, I think, the strategy, and I discussed this with Prime Minister Meles Zenawi, is to move towards more opening, more modernisation, and reaching out to both the global and regional markets, of course, provided there is stability. Clearly, it is not still the case either in Sudan or in the rest of the Horn of Africa.
Q: In your speech at Addis Abeba University (AAU), you praised the administration of Prime Minister Meles Zenawi for its leadership in facilitating the accession of Ethiopia to the WTO. However, we have heard the Prime Minister saying in the different sessions of the WEF on Africa, that his administration is not yet ready to liberalise the finance and telecom sectors. Do you see a contradiction between your commendation and his statement?
It is a question of phasing in, I think. My own view on this is that Ethiopia will benefit from more vibrant, more developed, and more open telecom and financial sectors, which are, in today's world, infrastructures as important as power, roads, rails, or airports. In modern economies, what we used to call infrastructures, when we learnt economics 30 years ago, is as much about the telecom sector. Countries who have opened their telecoms system get a lot of foreign direct investment (FDI) and have been doing extremely well because information technology is part of a system.
If you go to the commodity exchange in Addis Abeba, it is all technology. You know, when the farmer sells his products through his cell phone and it gets him money in the bank the next morning it is all made possible because of technology. This example shows that in order for this commodity exchange market - which is a great achievement - to percolate into poverty reduction, it has to be structured together with the banking system, which makes the settlement possible.
This is an example of how it can work.
Where there may be a sort of difference of view is on what is the speed of this opening. After all, Ethiopia remains, for the moment, a least developed country (LDC). There are capacity problems, which may justify why we say this is what we want to do in the medium, long, and short-term. Things can be done step-by-step.
There is no contradiction in this. Many LDC countries have acceded to the WTO by making commitments to open the market and reduce trade protections, in a phased-in way.
Other members accept this the moment there is some sort of certainty that things will happen in the future. It is a question of what is the right regime of change, and after all, the ones who determine this are the people who are responsible for the people of this country.
Q: One major challenge resulting in the lower competitiveness of Ethiopian exports on the global market has been high logistic costs. I have heard you, on many occasions, say that it is better for African countries to approach this thing on a quick-fix basis rather than waiting to have all of the resources combined to solve the bigger hurdle. What are your concrete quick-fix recommendations for the Ethiopian government to reduce logistics costs?
One thing is to accept that these countries need time to build the capacity to trade so that they will reach out to the global market. There are many things that can be done that do not shock your economy and that open trade, starting with border administration, which, in many ways, remains very cumbersome, bureaucratic, and red-tape based. There are many areas in infrastructure, where investing in infrastructure is investing in the future economy, and that is a sort of negative competitive shock.
So, there is whole stream of things that can be done to facilitate the business environment to improve the sort of transparency of the market. These are not something that will hurt a part of your economy, except if you believe that I better remain hidden in a business where I have rent and where I would like others to compute. There are behaviours of this kind, but, overall, it is a combination of capacity building: knowhow, innovation, education, infrastructure, and short-term measures that formidably facilitate business development.
Q: As it appears, currently, in most African countries, financial deepening is at its lows. What are your expectations, in the short-term, for trading capital in Africa?
I think it is mostly a question of adopting, at the right scale, proper financial regulations. What needs to be done is to set rules for a large enough perimeter, which means, regionally, a sort of size of 200 million people.
Within this regulatory frame, investors will come and develop their businesses. But, it will not work if a country has this regulation and, next door, there is another regulation. It is a question of harmonising the regulatory framework on a scale sufficient to mobilise investment and people who want to reach out to consumers.
Q: In one of the speeches that you made at the WEF on Africa, I heard you saying that one of the reasons for slow trade reform in some African countries is a lack of consolidated business interest. What is your assessment of the Ethiopian business climate on those terms?
I think, there are, if I look, for instance, at the Ethiopian accession project, a strong connection between business organisations and the government. It is on the topic of "What is the right quantum of trade opening?" that differences lay.
The point I made is, compared to other continents, such as Europe, Asia, North America, and Latin America, there still is not, in Africa, a strong business lobby to facilitate trade. That is why, when the solution was taken, last year, to create PADTRACK, a pan-African trade lobby, we supported it.
It is a force and an energy that will help governments move in the right direction. This is still in the making. Understandably, the vast size of entrepreneurship happening in Africa is still recent. It is only after a businessperson grows domestically that she would be worrying about how she can influence government to better her business.
Q: Mentioning of the Ethiopian accession to the WTO, what peculiarity have you observed in your assessment until now?
It is moving, I think. There are various streams of modernisation, like domestic legislation, that has something to do with the part of the legislative regime that is connected to doing trade.
That is the beginning. Step-by-step, of course, it needs parliamentary approval. Then, there is some sort of trade negotiation with WTO members, who are insisting that Ethiopia should open this or that because that is what they see as a potential market for them in the future.
First, you need to do it with goods, which we have an offer on this year. Then, you need to do it on services, which, obviously, is the complex matter because opening the market on services involves a large menu of options and they need time to understand all these options to make up their minds.
It is progressing, but it is large country. If you look at accession negotiations, some have taken five years and some have taken 18 years. So, there is a wide range of possibilities.
My sense is that it is moving, not extremely rapidly, but, again, the ones that decide how fast the negotiations move are two-thirds Ethiopian and one-third the rest of the WTO members.
Q: Cheap and easy finance from Asia, particularly China, is hampering trade reform in African countries, some say. What is your take on that?
I do not think so. Where China is investing is mostly in commodities, minerals, and energy. They are also investing in big infrastructure projects. They are targeting the basic infrastructure. I do not think this is becoming an obstacle for any country. http://allafrica.com/stories/201205220005.html

Ethiopia: How Meles rules the country (analysis)

African Arguments, by Richard Dowden* / Tuesday, 22 May 2012

Meles Zenawi is the cleverest and most engaging president in Africa - at least when he talks to visiting outsiders. When he speaks to his fellow Ethiopians, he is severe and dogmatic.

But he entertains western visitors with humour and irony, deploying a diffident, self-deprecating style which cleverly conceals an absolute determination to control his country and its destiny, free of outside interference.

He was one of four African presidents to be invited to the Camp David G8 meeting last weekend. The aid donors love Meles. He is well-informed, highly numerate and focused. And he delivers. Ethiopia will get closer to the Millennium Development Goals than most African countries. The Ethiopian state has existed for centuries and it has a bureaucracy to run it. So the aid flows like a river, nearly $4 billion a year. And Meles is the United States' policeman in the region with troops in Somalia and Sudan. He also enjoys a simmering enmity with his former ally, now the bad boy of the region, President Isias Afwerke of Eritrea. "It's Mubarak syndrome," a worried US diplomat told me. "We only talked to Mubarak about Egypt's role in the region, never about what was happening inside Egypt. It's the same with Ethiopia."
In the 2005 election when the opposition won the capital, Addis Ababa, and claimed to have won nationally, the government arrested its leaders and tried them for treason. Some were imprisoned, others fled into exile. Now with 99.6% of the vote, the ruling Ethiopian Peoples Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) has created a virtual one party state. In an interview last week Meles told me he did not know of a single village in the whole country that voted for the opposition.
This is subtle totalitarianism, dubbed 'Authoritarian Developmentalism' by some. If you do what the government says, you get assistance - land, water, services. If you don't, you get nothing. The basic principles of political freedom enshrined in the constitution are frequently undermined by subtle edicts from government departments. Press freedom is clearly spelt out and recently a minor ruling stated that printers must take responsibility for everything they publish and can refuse to print anything the government might consider illegal. Hardly a devastating blow to press freedom you might think until you discover that the only presses in Ethiopia capable of printing newspapers are government-owned.
Meles' remarkable achievement since he took power in 1991 has been to attract foreign companies to Ethiopia through a policy of low taxes and a free hand. Growth has been between 8 and 11 percent over the past eight years thanks to the private sector (both western and eastern.) The economy has doubled over the last five years. Meles is rushing to develop the country as fast as he can. Using the Chinese model he has attracted foreign investors to develop agriculture and manufacturing. As he told me: "The criticism we had in the past was that we were crazy Marxists. Now we are accused of selling the family spoons to foreigners. It's a balance."
Meles has leased more than 4 million hectares of land to foreign or domestic companies to grow food or flowers. And to provide them with water and power he has built dams which he says are environmentally much better than power stations since they are built in gorges with little water loss through evaporation. But it is not a completely free market solution. There are government monopolies in banking and telecoms. Nor will the government give people title deeds. All land is state owned. Meles has made it clear he will keep it that way.
"Have we created a perfect democratic system? No it's a work in progress. Are we running as fast as our legs will carry us? Yes. And it's not just Addis but also the most remote areas. Unlike previous governments we have really created a stable country in a very turbulent neighbourhood. Our writ runs in every village. That never happened in the history of Ethiopia. The state was distant, irrelevant."
He fiercely defends his policies, in the face of Western NGO criticism, that this development is environmentally unsound and indigenous people have been removed forcibly from their land. He insists that in every case they were consulted, dismissing a report by the Oakland Institute in the US which said people had been forcibly removed as "bullshit". When I suggest that pastoralists should be allowed to continue their nomadic way of life, he says I am a romantic westerner. But he adds that it is their right to continue their way of life.
It is the same with the politics. Having taken power by force in 1991 and coming from a minority, Meles created a safety valve by writing into the constitution the right of every "nation" in Ethiopia to declare independence. Whenever there are local political problem he re-asserts that right to leave but it is unlikely the clause will ever be put to the test through a referendum.
The current trouble spot is the southern region of Gambela where land has been given to agricultural businesses. Meles is defensive about reports of recent forced removals. "We are making sure that the Gambela people are settled and have land and that young people can go to farms not as guards but as farmers," he said, assuring me that the people who have been moved were consulted. Only when all those in the region who want to work have jobs will other workers be recruited from other parts of Ethiopia.
Is the Meles plan for rapid, state directed capitalism working? At the recent World Economic Forum meeting in the Ethiopian capital Addis Ababa earlier this month, criticism came, not from western NGOs , but from China, Ethiopia's closest ally. Gao Xiqing of the China Investment Forum, warned Meles: "Do not necessarily do what we did". Policies of "sheer economic growth" should be avoided, he said. "We now suffer pollution and an unequal distribution of wealth and opportunities... You have a clean sheet of paper here. Try to write something beautiful."
Has any Chinese official ever publically criticised an African leader in such terms before?
And some foreign investors are not happy either. They have driven Ethiopia's growth but now the government and Ethiopian firms are desperate for a greater slice of the profits. Flower and horticultural companies have been suddenly ordered by the government to only use Ethiopian companies for packing their produce, transporting it to Addis Ababa airport from where only the state-owned Ethiopian Airlines must be hired to fly it to Europe. As the distraught owner of one of the biggest flower farms told me last week: "Ethiopia does not have such companies yet". But if they refuse, their licences will be withdrawn. It appears that having lured foreign businesses into Ethiopia, the government is now tying them down and taking their profits.
Meles is caught in a bind, under pressure on several fronts with problems that economic growth may not solve. Inflation is coming down but has been running at almost 50 percent. Everyone I spoke with in Ethiopia said that the cost of living was the highest they had ever known. There is real hardship among the poor as the staple grain in Ethiopia, teff, has quadrupled in price recently. The universities are pouring out graduates but there are few jobs. One recent graduate I spoke with said she was one of about 10 out of more than 100 in her class who had a job. The government's hope is that it can grow the economy even faster. It is promising mining as the next bonanza and Meles hinted last week that oil has been discovered.
But this is the scenario he may soon be facing: a mass of urban poor hurt by the price rise of the staple food and large numbers of educated but unemployed urban youth. Sounds familiar? The Arab Spring was watched closely by Ethiopians. Watch this space.

* Richard Dowden is Director of the Royal African Society and author of Africa; altered states, ordinary miracles. http://www.afrika.no/Detailed/21737.html

Members of Congress urge Meles to end repression

By Mohamed Keita/CPJ Africa Advocacy Coordinator

Police try to restrain Ethiopian demonstrators protesting near the
G8 Summit at Camp David over the weekend. 

Two members of the U.S. Congress, a Republican and a Democrat, have publicly voiced indignation at Ethiopia's persecution of journalists under the leadership of Prime Minister Meles Zenawi, with both declaring that stability and security are enhanced by press freedom.

Sen. Mark Begich, an Alaska Democrat, published a statement Monday in theCongressional Record, the official daily journal of the U.S Congress, following the Camp David G8 Summit last weekend during which President Barack Obama convened four African leaders, including Meles of Ethiopia, for talks on food security in Africa.

In a letter to Obama, CPJ urged the president to engage Meles on ending Ethiopian censorship practices--such as suppressing independent reporting and denying media access to sensitive areas--that undermine international responses to food crises.

"I want to take this opportunity to address the necessity for the United States to help foster stable and democratic nations as partners as we build multilateral coalitions to tackle global issues," Begich said in his statement. Ethiopia is a key partner of the United States in counterterrorism and regional stability and a major recipient of U.S. humanitarian assistance. Recalling Obama's 2011 commitment to a G8 declaration on democracy, Begich declared that "as the events in North Africa and the Middle East have shown, supporting reliable autocrats who are helpful on matters of security and economics at the expense of human dignity, basic democratic rights, and access to economic opportunity is more perilous than ever to long-term U.S. national security interests."

Begich called for the end of the persecution of independent journalists and dissidents rounded up in Ethiopia in the wake of the Arab Spring. "To foster the benefits of a diverse citizenry, the many political prisoners and journalists should be released," he said. The senator urged colleagues in the U.S. Congress to join him in helping the citizens and government of the Horn of Africa country achieve a national consensus on the value of the free flow of information and make press freedom, as outlined in Ethiopia's constitution, a reality. "Such are hallmarks of inclusive and sustainable economic growth, and they provide a return of accountability and transparency to both American taxpayers and Ethiopian citizens," he added.

On Friday, Rep. Edward Royce sent a public letter to Meles in which he expressed "deep concern with the Republic of Ethiopia's disregard for press freedom." Royce, a California Republican who chairs a House subcommittee on terrorism, said "national security must not cripple press freedom." Expressing concern over the prosecution of 11 journalists on terror charges, Royce said that "the judicial process clearly fails to meet international standards," citing as an example the government's use of national public media to pressure the courts.

Over the weekend, hundreds of Ethiopian expats gathered near Camp David to protest the country's slide into authoritarianism, according to news reports. Washington is home to one of the largest Ethiopian diaspora communities in the world, a population that includes three Ethiopian journalists charged in absentia with terrorism in relation to their work, according to CPJ research. A fourth journalist, now languishing in a prison in the Ethiopian capital, Addis Ababa, was educated in the Washington area before returning to Ethiopia and launching one of the country's first independent newspapers. The former editor of another independent Ethiopian paper also lives in Washington after fleeing his homeland in the face of government intimidation. http://cpj.org/blog/2012/05/members-of-congress-urge-meles-to-end-repression.php